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1 Introduction
The First World Congress of the Game Theory Society took place from July 24 to 28,
2000 in Bilbao, Spain. Besides all living outstanding game theorists about seven hundred
people attended that conference. Their fields of research belonged to several classical
disciplines from Mathematics, Economics and Management and Decision Science, over
Sociology, Psychology, Law and Political Science to Biology, Engineering, Computer and
Neuro Sciences. This development had in some sense been predicted by Hurwicz (1945)
who when discussing von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) book already wrote:
The techniques applied by the authors in tackling economic problems are of
sufficient generality to be valid in political science, sociology ...
The Second World Congress in Marseille in 2004 that is just around the corner will most
likely attract even more scientists from even more fields.
According to Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart (Aumann and Hart, 1992)
Game Theory may be viewed as a sort of umbrella or ‘unified field’ theory
for the rational side of social science ... [that] does not use different, ad
hoc constructs ... [but] develops methodologies that apply in principle to all
interactive situations.
One might see this description as an euphemistic overstatement of game theorists regard-
ing their own discipline. But their view and emphasis on the crucial role of game theory
is confirmed by the philosopher John Elster (Elster, 1982) who writes:
... if one accepts that interaction is the essence of social life, then game
theory provides solid micro foundations for the study of social structure and
social change.
Admittedly, there are other, more sceptical voices, too. So we find on the back cover of
the book “Game Theory. A critical Introduction” by Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis
(1995) the provocative question:
Does game theory simply repeat what everyone already knows in a language
that no one understands?
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This formulation perfectly reflects a widespread hostility towards mathematics as a lan-
guage and maliciously identifies “know” with “suspect”. The language of mathematics
provides us with a level of precision and rigor of communication that can hardly be
achieved otherwise and enables us to make the crucial progress from conjecture to proof
and from suspicion to knowledge.
In Hurwicz (1953) we find the passage
The theory of games thus has an undispatched fascination for, and a stim-
ulating effect on, workers in many fields, ranging from (comparatively) pure
mathematics to applied social sciences.
Fifty years later game theoretic models have indeed already conquered large parts of social
science and play an increasingly important role in other sciences. But what exactly is game
theory? What are its natural objectives? And where are the borders of game theory and
the limits of game theoretic modelling?
Game theory is a mathematical approach to the modelling of human interaction in groups
and societies. Despite some much earlier work concerning various aspects and even notions
of game theory, for instance by Edgeworth (1871), Cournot (1838), Zermelo (1912) or E.
Borel (1921), it is almost generally agreed that, fathered by John von Neumann in his 1928
“Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele”, it was born as a new discipline in 1944 when von
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published their book “Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior”.
The structural resemblance of situations of economic or social interactions to parlour
games had inspired von Neumann and caused the by now generally adopted name of the
new theory. Several early extensions and novel contributions, mainly by John F. Nash,
broadened the basis of game theory and enabled its inexorable progress.
Game theory is concerned with the analysis of purposeful interaction of individuals with
partially conflicting interests in a group or society. It makes use of a variety of formal
concepts and diverse mathematical tools. Considered as a sub-discipline of mathematics it
is akin to geometry or probability theory in the sense that any of its models is tightly linked
to a non-mathematical real world scenario, that is supposed to be understood via a careful
analysis of that associated mathematical model and its due interpretation. The potentially
different degrees of rationality, knowledge, information, skills and power of interacting
individuals, their various interests and inclinations as well as varying institutional, legal
or environmental frameworks generate an enormous variety of different game theoretic
models. And there is an abundance of scenarios in the real world that may be modelled
by such games.
The subdivision of game theory in different fields as cooperative (non-transferable utility;
transferable utility), non-cooperative, Bayesian, stochastic, evolutionary, experimental
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game theory and mechanism theory reflects its high flexibility and capability of reacting
to specific needs arising from various problems.
Traditional game theory that is firmly based on the concept of an unrestrictedly rational
homo oeconomicus and, according to the above quotation of Aumann and Hart concerns
“the rational side of social sciences” may be reaching its limits. But this very fact is
the cause for its expansion and extension to behavioral game theory, and thereby its
crossing the borders of neighboring social sciences. The strength of game theory lies in its
conceptual precision, its rigor and its consequent use of various mathematical methods.
Despite an almost identical vocabulary frequently to be found in sociology a wide ditch
still separates large parts of sociology from the so called hard sciences. In contrast to
the latter ones, sociological analysis is largely narrative and the argumentation is akin to
that in philosophy, based on sanity and reason rather than on formal proofs or empirical
data. Therefore, the sociologist Paul B. Hill criticises the representatives of (German)
qualitative social research for their view, according to which the “infinite complexity” of
action makes its description and explanation by scientific methods impossible. According
to him that attitude makes sociology cease to be a science and slide down to feuilleton level.
As a way out of this dilemma for sociologists he suggests the rational choice paradigm,
basic to classical game theory, as a methodological base for an attempt to an explanatory
general theory of action [see Hill (2000, p. 73]. According to David Hilbert a scientific
discipline that reaches a certain degree of maturity automatically falls into the realm
of mathematics. Exactly this is happening presently to social sciences thanks to the
development of game theory.
2 Social Sciences
The basic ingredient of a society is the interaction of individual entities. But while an
analysis of this interaction and its determining conditions, and their mutual dependence
would be considered part of biology rather than of social science its counterpart if the indi-
vidual entities are human definitely belongs to the realm of social sciences like psychology,
sociology, anthropology and economics. Needless to say that the borderline between both
agendas is fuzzy and that there are plenty of behavioral similarities between humans and
mammals, in particular primates, that imply transdisciplinary approaches.
In a human society the eternal controverse is what is more fundamental the individual
or the society. This question roughly separates psychology from sociology and microe-
conomics from macroeconomics. Interdisciplinary dialogues have weakened the positions
and stressed the possibility that neither one is more fundamental.
While this matter appears not to be the key aspect in positive or empirical approaches, it is
an extremely explosive subject for normative theory. Whose interests and goals should be
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more significant for the way a society organizes itself, social or individual ones, solidarity
or individual values, law and order or individual freedom? This raises the question as to
what are the norms of a society, how do they arise and what institutions develop or are
created to enforce those norms?
We want to understand, how aggregate behavior of individuals creates institutions and
how existing institutions influence individual behavior; how the size of groups or societies
influences the way individuals interact; how rationality, customs and emotions determine
human actions; when cooperation outweighs competition and vice versa; and how his-
torical experience shapes a society’s development. We want to understand whether new
structures emerge from aggregate individual behavior and whether the program of reduc-
tion of social phenomena, that is the idea of a complete micro foundation, is sound and
possible, at least in principle.
We may address all these problems and questions in manifold ways with different ap-
proaches and tools. And the degree of vagueness of description or formalization of the
problems determines the degree of precision and reliability of the results. These may vary
from aphorisms, transferring general wisdom to concrete, sometimes quantifiable results
in specific models. It is the mathematical modelling that opens the way to empirically
testable or formally provable statements.
Even if game theory by its concepts and results may stimulate also the more philosophical
non-quantitative parts of social science, it is their latter model-based part that really
profits from game theory.
3 Game Theory
Game Theory may most roughly be devided into cooperative and non-cooperative theory.
The misleading terminology - it is the game that may be cooperative or non-cooperative
rather than the theory - has become standard by now.
Non-cooperative game theory tries to extend a single individual’s decision problem to a
multi-person context. Identifying first for simplicity decisions and actions for a single
individuum a decision theory has to specify the individual’s choice alternatives and his
criteria for choice. Application of these criteria yields the individual’s choice(s).
Adding the requirement of rationality, formalized duely, the decision problem gets more
specified and is often tantamount to an optimization problem. This is usually described
by an objective (or target) function associating to each of the available choice alternatives
a value represented by a real number and interpreted as the individual’s valuation of this
alternative.
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It is assumed that a rational individual chooses in such a way among its alternatives as
to maximize the value of the chosen alternative. The set of alternatives may be restricted
in several ways, among them the effects of actions of other individuals. As long as these
other individuals are described only as parameters for the first individual’s choice prob-
lem, we are still in the context of individual decision or optimization theory. Matters
change drastically when we want to analyze simultaneously decision problems of several
interacting persons, whose actions bring about mutual restrictions to each other’s prob-
lems. Then we are in the context on non-cooperative games. These may be distinguished
as simultaneous one - shot games, so called games in strategic form versus games with
sequential moves of different agents, called games in extensive form.
Let me concentrate on the former ones. They are most clearly apt to show the fundamental
difference from a single person decision problem. Imagine two persons A und B both
having two choice alternatives a1, a2 and b1, b2, respectively. Each person’s choice is a
parameter for the other person’s decision problem. If both persons’ values of their two
available alternatives, given the other person’s choice as a parameter, are described by
real valued functions UA, UB we get four optimization problems:
The first one is: Maximize the value of the function UA over the alternatives a1, a2 under
the parametrical restriction that person B chooses b1.
The shorter mathematical description of this problem is:
maxi=1,2 u
A(ai, b1).







The problem is that the simultaneity of choices prevents each person to know what the
correct parameter of his optimization problem is, as this parameter could only be known
after the opponent’s decision has been made. Now what are optimal decisions in such
a situation? One may be in the fortunate situation that both persons’ best choices are
independent of their opponent’s choices so that both have dominant choices. Such a situ-
ation brings us essentially back to two well-defined simultaneous optimization problems of
the two persons. This may still cause fundamental interpretational or even philosophical
problems. For instance, the famous prisoners’ dilemma falls in this class of situations.
But it at least solves for that special class how to define simultaneous optimality.
The situation becomes much more difficult when both players’ optimal choices change
with the parameters determined by their opponent’s choices. Here the analogue for an
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optimal choice of a single individuum is the famous Nash equilibrium.
It is a pair of choices (a∗, b∗) for the two players such that no other available choice for
A would improve A in case of the parameter being b∗ and no other available choice for B
would improve him in case of his parameter being a∗.
Mathematically, in our situation this can be described by two simultaneous inequalities:
UA(a∗, b∗) ≥ UA(ai, b∗) for i = 1, 2
UB(a∗, b∗) ≥ UB(a∗, bj) for j = 1, 2.
It is important to know that these inequalities characterize the Nash equilibrium as the






But this fact should not be misunderstood as meaning that (a∗, b∗) could in practice
be determined by solving these two problems. Persons A und B are ignorant of their
respective parameters b∗ and a∗ and therefore unable to formulate, let alone to solve,
their problems. The possibility to characterize a Nash equilibrium as a simultaneous
solution of several optimization problems does not enable the players to determine it by
just solving these problems.
To get an intuition of what that way of solving the problem would mean imagine, that
both individuals would need to solve some optimization problem to get their optimal
choices but would already have to know the result of their opponent’s problem in order
to formulate the own problem.
So what is a game in strategic form?
There is a set of n persons, called players, say N = {1, ..., n}. Each player i ∈ N has a
set Si of choice alternatives, called strategies. Moreover each player has a so called pay
off function pii that associates to any profile of strategies of all players his resulting value.
Formally a game is a list Γ := (S1, ..., Sn; pi1, ...pin) with pii : S1 × ... × Sn → R :
(s1, ..., sn) 7→ pii(s1, ..., sn), i = 1, ..., n.
The payoff pii(s1, ..., sn) for player i, if players j = 1, ..., n choose sj, is a real number. It
may be interpreted as a payoff in any arbitrary medium whose quantity can be measured
and expressed by positive real numbers. One specific way to interpret this payoff is as that
players’ utility (increment) induced for him by all players’ aggregate choices of (s1, ... sn).
Now a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ is a list (s∗1, ..., s
∗








n) ≥ pii(s∗1, ...si, ..., s∗n) for all si ∈ Si and for all i ∈ N .
There may exist one equilibrium in a given game, several ones or none.
Like in individual decision theory the existence of a unique best alternative is an excep-
tional case. So in general, non-cooperative game theory is plagued by a multiplicity of
equilibria. That means prescriptions of how to act without any coordination or coop-
eration are in general impossible. Non-cooperative game theory has to confine itself to
suggest what should be excluded from choice. There have been refinements of the notion
of a Nash equilibrium, most prominently two versions of perfect equilibrium due to Selten.
But they do not free non-cooperative game theory from this multiplicity problem.
The social environment, in which non-cooperative game theory is meaningfully applied,
is one in that any kind of binding contract or commitment about actions is unavailable.
Lying and cheating is possible without sanctions. So a player’s announcements and
promises in a pre-play phase are credible only, if they are totally in line with his best
interests. But if the latter can be computed or determined by rational reasoning the
former are superfluous.
Yet, things are not happening in an unlegislated area. It is implicitly assumed that
restriction of all individuals to their specified strategy sets is in principle enforcable and
can therefore be taken for granted. So an oligopolistic firm’s strategies may be described
by certain price or quantity levels of production. Implicitly, use of brutal force and
weapons in order to remove the competitors are illegal, and thus no available options.
Non-cooperative game theory is also able to handle situations of incomplete and asymmet-
ric information of players about the realization of uncertain events and on their coplayers’
specific characteristics. Payoffs become more complex then, as become strategies. The
use of random experiments to determine mixed strategies and the evaluation via expected
payoff or expected utility allows it to deal with those more complex situations in essen-
tially the same way as sketched above. The Nash equilibrium in that context is called
Bayesian-Nash.
The ability to formalize a concise optimality concept via an equilibrium notion in the con-
text of multi-person interaction is a great achievement. It opens the way to a much more
detailed and precise analysis of strategic interaction than a purely narrative approach.
But the assumed non-cooperative extremely competitive and self-centered environment
of non-cooperative game theory is only one extreme case.
Another one is an environment where promises and contracts can be enforced and there-
fore be relied on. That is the context of cooperative game theory. Actions leading to
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certain outcomes are assumed to be feasible and legal and vanish in the background. It
is the contracted result, its social value and its individual values that is of main interest.
Not individuals, the players, but groups of them, coalitions, play the main role in that
approach. Achievements of coalitions are described in a stylized way by associated real
numbers, interpreted as the worths of coalitions. The idea is that it reflects some kind of
maximally achievable welfare of that coalition in the considered context. Without being
made explicit a group’s welfare or worth is an indicator of the utility levels the members
of the group could achieve by acting as a coalition.
In a purely utilitarian tradition the worth of a coalition would be the maximum of the sum
of its members’ utility levels achievable via joint action. The use of a unique worth of a
coalition implicitly assumes that worth may be shifted arbitrarily between the members of
a coalition. Game theorists speak of transferable utility. If utility is not transferable what
is achievable by a coalition needs a more complex description. It is a set of all vectors
of utility levels of the coalition members that can be realized via joint action. But direct
transfer of utility at universal rates is excluded here. The described distinction leads to
a classification of cooperative games into transferable utility games, also TU-games, and
non-transferable utility games, also NTU-games. The former may be easily modelled as
special cases of the latter ones.
So a cooperative NTU-game in coalitional form for the set N of players is described by a
coalitional set-valued function (or correspondence) V that associates with any non-empty
subset T of players in N a set V (T ) ⊂ R|T |, where |T | is the number of players in T .
Each vector in the |T |−dimensional set V (T ) describes via its coordinates potential fea-
sible utility levels for the members of T .
The ingenious idea of Nash (1953) was it, to formalize the concept of a solution for a class
G of NTU-games, as a function (or correspondence) associating with any game V a (set
of) vector(s) of utility levels for all players that could be achieved in V .
Now axioms expressing various notions of fairness, equity, justness or envy-freeness allow
it to develop a normative value theory for cooperative games and to formally analyze the
(non-) consistency of several concepts and axiomatic requirements.
The power of this more stylized approach to game theory lies in the fact that many
different economic or social scenarios induce or generate in a natural way cooperative
NTU-games.
The solution of the games can be traced back to certain states of the underlying social
model that induce that solution. This allows welfare evaluations of social states agreed
on via coalitional contracts.
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4 Mechanisms and Implementation
While games, cooperative or non-cooperative, work with payoff vectors for the players,
these may be interpreted as being in monetary or, alternatively, in utility units (“utils”).
Social choice theory is looking at outcome sets, interpreted as sets of possible social states,
on which all agents of a given population have preferences or, to make it simpler, utility
functions. That means that each agent evaluates each possible social state by using his
utility function.
Finally, if N = {1, ..., n} is the society and A is the set of possible social states, we have
for all i ∈ N : ui : A→ R.
Social choice theory is concerned with the problem how to associate with any potential
population from a prespecified pool of populations, each represented by its vector u =
(u1, ..., un) of utility functions, a set of desired outcomes in A. Such a correspondence is
called a social choice rule.
One may adopt the concept of an outcome set for applications of game theory. This
concept is very flexible and allows various quite different applications. It could be, for
instance, a set of feasible allocations of commodities or it could be the set of candidates
for an election.
Using the concept of an outcome set A allows it to decompose certain games into its rules
and its players’ utility functions. Like a predicate robbed of its verb becomes a predicate
form, a non-cooperative game in strategic form with the payoffs replaced by outcomes
becomes a game form.
So imagine a whole class (or pool) of potential populations of n players, who all have
utility functions on a certain outcome set A.
A game form, also called mechanism, is a list M := (S1, ..., Sn; g), where g : S1 × ... ×
Sn → A is called outcome function. Such an outcome function might be specified as a
social rule or law, saying that whatever profile (s1, ..., sn) any of those player populations
would choose, once called for becoming active, the resulting social outcome would be
g(s1, ...sn) ∈ A.
Now consider a specific population N = {1, ..., n} of players. To decide what strategies
they would use they would first look at the outcomes of their different strategy choices
and then evaluate these outcomes with their n individual utility functions ui, i = 1, ..., n.
Mathematically, they would compose the mappings ui and g to build their payoff functions
pii via pii(s1, ..., sn) = ui(g(s1, ..., sn)), i = 1, ..., n.
So they would de facto play the game ΓM := (S1, ..., Sn; pii, ..., pin) and solve it for a Nash
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equilibrium.
Clearly, different populations of players with different utility functions would define dif-
ferent games from the same game form and, thus induce different Nash equilibria.
Now, the problem of mechanism design is it to create for a given pool of populations
game rules, i.e. a mechanism, such that any population if called for playing according to
these rules by playing a Nash equilibrium realizes an outcome that is desired according
to a prespecified social choice rule. This way of establishing socially desired outcomes
via strategic interaction in designed games allows many applications in contract theory,
economic analysis of law and policy analysis. The designers of a constitution intended to
work for countless future not yet known generations build a very illustrative example of
the above idea.
We need one more step now to link cooperative and non-cooperative game theory using
the above framework.
I imagine that the set of desired outcomes is always determined by the members of a
specific population from the pool by solving a cooperative game. Technically this means
that the payoff vectors prescribed by the specific ruling cooperative solution have to be
traced back to the underlying special state or outcome that induces this payoff vector.
We may ask then: What kind of non-cooperative game in strategic form can via its Nash
equilibria produce the same outcome and payoffs as the cooperative solution we started
with? This research agenda has, following ideas of Nash, been called the Nash program.
It is intimately related to mechanism theory (c.f. Trockel (2002)).
5 Multiplicity of equilibria
Many game theorists consider the general non-uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and its
refinements a curse. I tend to consider it a blessing. To understand this, one better looks
at dynamic non-cooperative games developing in time in a sequence of moves of the n
players. Players may or may not know the exact previous choices of their co-players. All
potential ways of playing such a game may be represented by a tree, similar to a decision
tree of finite length, where at each final node a payoff vector describes each player’s payoff
in case the play ends here.
A book prescribing to a certain player exactly which move to choose, whenever it is his
turn, represents a strategy. Putting these strategies together in strategy sets we come
easily to a game in strategic form, a concept we already know. But the more aggregate
strategic form game is less detailed and informative than the extensive form game we
started with.
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Now look at the extensive form game. By the whole sequence of moves each player reveals
some of his intentions. If there is a unique equilibrium this may be unimportant. But
say there are two. Consequently, choosing in accordance with equilibrium number 1 by
player A may after a while impress player B and convince him of giving up his original
intention to realize equilibrium number 2. Experience of stubbornness or insistence may
play a role in determining the final outcome, even if both equilibria represent fully rational
behavior of both players. The multiplicity of equilibria leaves room for the influence of
other personel characteristics than just rationality. It leaves room for psychology and
learning as crucial codeterminants of social outcomes.
6 Bounded rationality
Experimental economics has tested in countless series of different experiments rational
behavior of individuals in single person decision situations as well as in various non-
cooperative and cooperative games. The results are very much context dependent and do
not transmit a unique general insight. Nevertheless, they give rise to considerable justified
doubt that rationality is the right assumption for modelling individual decisions. These
developments have led to consider bounded rational behavior of individuals formalized in
various different ways. In principle, bounded rationality of interacting agents does not
preclude the use of game theory. Rather than looking for optimal strategies or outcomes
one may be satisfied with those fulfilling certain criteria. And there are game theoretical
models where rational players are replaced by automata. Such automata need not be less
rational than human persons, though. While deep blue, a chess program that defeated
Kasparov in 1997, was lacking human intuition in estimating and evaluating situations in
a play of chess, its computational power exceeded human abilities by far. A less compu-
tationally powerful program endowed with more human-like intuition was able to enforce
a draw in a competition with Kasparov in 2003. Rationality is a high dimensional con-
cept that therefore allows bounds of very different kinds. But game theory is able to
handle bounded rationality and is supposed to even gain from the result higher flexibility
in incorporating other criteria and aspects suggested from other social sciences than eco-
nomics. Not surprisingly the Nobel prize for Economics of 2002 had been awarded to the
psychologist Kahnemann and the experimental economist Vernon Smith. Some caveat
is appropriate, however, in judging experimental economists’ claim that most standard
game theoretic solutions tend to be not realized in experiments. Apart from framing
effects that experienced experimenters are able to avoid the experimenters never know for
sure whether the solutions they set out for testing are computed from the correct utility
functions of the participating players. And if payoffs are in money the same solution
concept might result in different utility payoffs, for different individual utility functions.
Some game theorists, therefore, suggest to develop a theory of revealed preferences in
games in analogy to that of the microeconomic theory of consumers (cf. Zhou and Rey
(2001)).
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But experiments have provided valuable insights about what determinants apart from
pure rationality are responsible for human decisions and how specific contextual features
may influence the outcomes. All this is part of the dialogue game theory had started with
other social sciences.
7 Evolution and learning
Game theory has turned out remarkably successful in evolutionary biology and insights
gained there have been used in models of learning in social contexts. Evolutionary biology
uses the formal concept of a non-cooperative game, static as well as dynamic, in an
unconventional way. There are no players, who choose strategies in order to maximize
some monetary or utility payoff. Rather a random device picks two representatives from
the two strategy sets of a given strategic form game, who have to “play against each
other”. Both strategies matched to each other automatically produce the payoff vector,
whose two coordinates are determined by the given game. The payoffs interpreted here
as “fitness” of the types of strategy, increase the probability of that type to be picked
randomly in a next round. Here “nature” chooses randomly pairings of strategies (types)
and the resulting payoffs determine the survival probability of those types in the varying
pool of strategies.
Interesting enough, such models of evolution or models of learning, in some sense akin to
them, frequently result in outcomes that correspond to equilibria of real strategic games
or solutions of cooperative games (cf. Young (1998)).
8 Conclusion
The variety of models and applications might have conveyed an impression of the power
and richness of game theory. There is hardly a social phenomenon that is not accessible
via game theoretic modelling. Clearly, it should have become clear by now that game
theory is not the unified general theory of human interaction in the society. It rather is a
tool chest, full of methods, concepts and devices whose applicability and effectivity vary
and depend very much on the concrete context or framework.
Its mathematic nature is very powerful in providing clear insight into what results depend
on what kind of assumptions. The mental or conceptual resolution induced by the use
of mathematics is a clear advantage for any attempt of thorough understanding of the
fundamental social phenomena. Let me give an example supporting this position.
In his booklet “Soziale Konflikte” Ansgar Thiel (2003) is also treating game theory as one
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of the existing approaches. During his discussion this author identifies “two-player games
with strictly opposed interests” and “two-person zero-sum games”. Comprehensible as
this view may be for the formally untrained it distinctly demonstrates a lack of resolution
for which one should not reproach this specific author but rather the apparatus he is using
for his analysis.
Clearly a two person zero-sum game, which is characterized by the fact that the payoffs
of the two players A und B add up to zero, whatever their strategy choices are, is a game
of strictly opposite interest.
But now consider a different game derived from the previous one by letting any negative
payoff of both players be the same as before and taking the positive payoff of one player
to the square. The interests are still strictly opposite, but the game is not any more a
zero-sum game, unless in the original game all payoffs were only 0, 1 or −1.
But this is not the end of a sharper look at opposite interests. In contrast to what Thiele
claims the payoffs of the two players need not even be summable in any meaningful way.
The description by real numbers of a social phenomenon does not justify to perform all
operations that are possible for real numbers. They must be checked on their admissibility
as an interpretable operation in the underlying social model. For instance, if player A
receives his payoff in apples, player B in oranges, where negative amounts mean a duty
of delivery, summing up is not even meaningful. Nevertheless, if whenever a change
of strategies that increases (decreases) the amount of apples A receives, simultaneously
decreases (increases) the amount of oranges B gets we have strictly opposite interests,
provided the players like their payoffs.
The strict use of formal argumentation as a reliable device to ensure correctness of argu-
ments may be sometimes incomprehensive and considered even a provocation by people
with a different methodological background. But it has the merits that it allows to replace
plausability arguments by propositions that may be proved or disproved.
A mainly verbal treatment of social phenomena and social interaction is like a translation
from a foreign language without sufficient knowledge of the vocabulary and the grammar.
It may offer a suitable rough description but can hardly produce a deep detailed analysis.
I think game theory can play the role of the language of social science but as any living
language it has to be open to permanent change, to absorbtion of new concepts and
methods and to the adoption of parts from other languages (disciplines) when itself fails
to offer an adequate term. And as any language it cannot be learned without a certain
effort and the readiness to exercise. The payoff for starting to use game theoretic language
will be a more effective and more precise scientific communication.
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